One of the things about playing a Chinese position in Glory games is what to do about a navy. At the start of a game in 1700 there isn't a navy in any of the provinces so an early decision for any player of any of the Chinese positions is whether to build a navy from scratch. It of course depends on the position you are playing as to whether to do this or not, as at least one position has a relatively short coastline. There is, of course, no "central" fleet for the empire any more than there is a "central" army for the empire so there is no secret elsewhere in game that can defend the coast.
An issue in game is the perception that the Qing Dynasty was somehow scared of the sea, so the idea of a Chinese Navy is seen in the same way as that of a Russian Navy or a Prussian Yacht Club. Add in the knowledge of Ming loyalists who became pirates, plus the weakness of the Imperial Chinese Navy in the late 19th Century and a tendency to project that back in time, and the idea of developing an early 18th Century Chinese fleet can seem almost comical.
Things however have become complicated in recent times. in 2002 Gavin Menzies, a retired RN officer, published "1421" concerning the journeys of a number of Chinese fleets, under the overall command of Zheng He, that started in that year. What made Menzies book unusual was his claims about how far these fleets had gone. Many accept that the fleets did travel to a range of locations in the Far East, India and even the east coast of Africa, but Menzies claimed they had circumnavigated the world. Among his claims are that the Bimini Road is the remains of a Chinese attempt to repair part of a fleet that was damaged and that an obscure record from 15th Century Iceland records a Chinese attack there. One thing that is worth stressing is that Menzies never claimed one fleet went everywhere but rather a series of fleets undertook these global adventures.
The book itself is I think an interesting insight into early 15th Century Chinese naval technology and is a good way of highlighting there was an ocean-going tradition in China...but it's up to you how much you want to believe of how far these fleets actually went.
Menzies went on to write a sequel called "1434", which claims a small Chinese squadron, led by Zheng He, reached Italy in 1434 and kickstarted the Renaissance. It does go against some of his claims in "1421" and while I won't pass judgement on it let's just say I still have a copy of "1421" but not "1434".
Menzies claims have quite rightly been questioned by many historians and, to be frank, much of his "global" claims have been shown to be false. In many ways it is a shame as a more limited work, restricting the claims to say Far Eastern/Indian/African travels would have possibly been much more accepted...but perhaps of less interest to a western audience.
What has happened however is how the claims of "1421" have become accepted in China. It is fair to say that really from the mid 15th Century up until the early 21st Century, Zheng He's journeys and naval exploits were ignored and even wiped from the history books. However in recent times, I think we can all agree that China has started to expand its influence, in the Far East and Africa and this, I feel, has led to a renewal in the earlier naval traditions of China and Zheng He's journeys. While I would not say that Chinese academia has fully endorsed Menzies claims, some elements do appear to and there are long-standing claims of recent archaeological finds of the remains of some of his ships (that "prove" their immense size) as well as the building of replicas of his ships and of Zheng He theme parks. Interesting though the maritime museum in Hong Kong has been quite dismissive of Menzies work...however this could be due to a lingering legacy of its British roots and the tendency of British maritime historians to be a bit dismissive of the naval achievements of other nations
In a world however where China is trying to become a naval power, has recently added aircraft carriers to its fleet, with claims of up to 12 being built, as well as assault ships, nuc subs with inter-continental missiles...it is not surprising there would be a desire to reconnect with an earlier naval tradition.
Then there is the issue of Qing naval policy. As I said above, there is a belief that the Qing Dynasty was "scared of the sea". This is supposed to be seen in the decision to force a large part of the coastal community to move inland. This was at a time when remaining Ming loyalists were pirates, operating out of Taiwan among other places and there was a feeling among the Qing that the coastal communities in the South of their new empire at least were sympathetic to the Ming.
There have been efforts in recent years to suggest a different perspective, that the early Qing were not "scared of the sea" and did operate a powerful fleet, if a coastal one. A conference in 2012 at SOAS included a seminar called "The Dragon Navy:Maritime Militarization in the Great Qing", which argued there was a coastal Qing fleet and that the early Qing had a cohesive naval policy. The speaker's phd paper on the subject is online at https://archiv.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/volltextserver/18877/1/PhD_Dissertation_CyPO.pdf and I understand this was published as a book last year that has had mixed reviews. I have noticed there are also now, online at least, some passing reference to an "Eight Banners Navy" and "Green Standard (Army) Navy" that I am sure were not obvious a couple of years back.
As with Menzies, I do not agree with all of the claims now being made by some about the early Qing fleet and naval policy and I suspect at least some of it has to do with modern Chinese diplomatic ambitions.
so, what does this mean for how I play a Chinese position in Glory? While I don't agree always with the claims made, I am willing to use them as inspiration in a game that is, by nature, alternative history, to play a Chinese governor who wants to recall a time when Chinese fleets did travel far and wide (even if how far and how wide is open to interpretation).
However when looking at interpretations of Chinese naval history, I feel it is a useful study of the old line "History is written by the victors". That is generally true and when it comes to Chinese naval history I feel the victors were the European powers in the late 19th Century and so it is often seen as they saw it, weak and a sign of the weakness of the Empire. However in the 21st Century, there is an effort to rebalance things, offer an alternative perspective on Chinese naval history and while that rebalancing is, to a degree, essential, to give us a more realistic picture, there is a danger of embracing it too much and going too far the other way.