Marshal Bombast wrote:I completely agree with everything people have been saying but can't help but think part of the issue with digging in is the quality of the army and partly the quality and availability of the cavalry. The Streltsi were difficult to encourage change in as well as the rest of society. The typical Russian seemed to have more of an acceptance of their life, while the Streltsi seemed to be more active in protecting the Russian way of life.
If Russia can overcome these issues then they should have a better chance on the field of battle, and scouting to protect flanks on the march. I think the use of artillery was more due to putting low quality troops into fortifications so they weren't mobile and helped to keep the enemy units further away and increase the shooting range beyond the musket.
The OOB in "Peter the Great Humbled" above has 69 regimental 3 pdrs and 53 covering a variety (mainly bronze) of guns, mortars and howitzers when the army surrendered with 10-20 elsewhere. This does not sound like a heavy reliance on artillery to me. Different period I know but Napoleon's I Corps had 513 guns at Waterloo. Borodino Napoleon had 152 guns in his I Corps compared to 72 for Russia's primary (II) Corps. Then again perhaps it was more a case of the ideal compared to the actual?
Clearly during the hundred years from our period to the Napoleonic Wars the size of armies in terms of total manpower and number of guns grew hugely.
So I think the best way to judge the reliance placed by an Army on artillery is by the number of guns per 1,000 men.
At Pruth in 1711 Peter had an estimated 40,000 men and 122 Guns a ratio of 3.05 guns per thousand men.
Compared to this at Blenheim in 1704 Malborough had 52,000 men and 60 guns ratio 1.15 against a Franco-Bavarian Army with 56,000 men and 90 guns ratio of 1.61.
Due to circumstances of Blenheim with Allied Army joined by crack Austrian foot/horse not slowed by Artillery this allied ratio may be low since at Raillies in 1706 Malborough had 62,000 foot and 120 guns ratio of 1.93
Poltava were Peter had 80,000 men and only 100 guns gives a low ratio of 1.25 but he was in pusuit/punishing cossacks mood in the heart of the Ukraine and faced with a mere 21,500 Swedes wth 4 guns ratio 0.18 he still dug in and used his guns to stop the Swedish attack.
I would argue that Narva a more long term planned Russian campaign were Peter had 60,000 men and 179 Guns for a ratio of 2.98 guns per thousand is with the Pruth a more typical Russian Army gun ratio.
Considering question of why some armies relied more on Artillery than others think major reasons are a) Some Generals like Peter, Dunn & Napoleon just like cannon more than others.........Charles of Sweden seems to have been basically against anything which slowed his Army down be that Cannon or Cavalry wearing armour b) Poor quality troops seem to need more Artillery support it is very noticeable that as the quality of the Prussian Army of the seven years war and the French Army of the Napoleonic Wars declined so the number of guns per 1,000 men went up sharply c) Terrain.........no one seems to have been able to deploy many guns in Spain and Switzerland for instance but on the flat wide open spaces of eastern Europe you finally get to the Artillery killing fields of Leipzig and Borodino.
Ref Borodino 120,000 Russians dig in with 640 Guns ratio 5.3 guns per 1,000. Clearly something in the Russian Military mind-set likes digging and likes artillery the more and bigger the better! Not sure if its in the game or not but Russian Armies without a field work or artillery in sight would seem to be "unhappy".
If we look at a Mid Napoleonic Wars battle ie Wagram (my favourite):
Napoleon had 189,000 men and 488 guns a ratio of 2.58 guns per thousand men.
Though it must be said the the French Guns in 1809 fired heavier shot a lot quicker and further than Peters guns.